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Sanchez v. Wal-Mart, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 (Dec. 24, 2009)1
Tort – Negligence and Wrongful Death
Summary
Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal from a district court dismissal of their complaint against
several pharmacies for wrongful death and personal injury in a common-law negligence and
negligence per se action.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed. The Nevada Supreme Court held that pharmacies owe neither a special nor a
statutory duty of care to unidentified third parties, and that Appellant’s complaint was therefore
properly dismissed by the district court for failing to state a claim for which relief could be
granted.
Factual and Procedural History
On June 4, 2004, Defendant Patricia Copening, not a party to this appeal, struck Gregory
Sanchez, Jr. and Appellant Robert Martinez with her vehicle as they were attempting to fix a flat
tire on US Highway 95, killing Sanchez and seriously injuring Martinez. Copening was
subsequently arrested for driving under the influence of drugs. Appellants, Sanchez’s minor
daughters and his widow, representing Sanchez’s personal estate, and Martinez and his wife
brought wrongful death and personal injury actions against Copening, two medical doctors, and a
medical association.
Discovery uncovered a June 2003 letter from the Prescription Controlled Substance
Abuse Prevention Task Force to several pharmacies and prescribing physicians informing them
that Copening had obtained approximately 4,500 hydrocodone pills from 13 pharmacies between
May 2002 and May 2003. Plaintiffs/Appellants amended their complaint to add the pharmacies
as defendants, alleging that the pharmacies wrongfully continued to fill Copening’s prescriptions
despite the Task Force letter informing them of Copening’s prescription drug activities.
The pharmacies moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which
relief can be granted and for summary judgment. The district court noted that in the absence of
legislative authority on the question of pharmacies’ duty of care to unidentified third parties, the
issue was governed by Nevada’s cases regarding dram-shop liability, which indicate by analogy
that there is no proximate cause between filling valid prescriptions and the subsequent injury.
Therefore, the district court granted the pharmacies’ motion to dismiss and denied the motion for
summary judgment as moot, certifying its decision as final per NRCP 54(b).
Plaintiffs/
Appellants took this appeal.
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Discussion
The Court grants rigorous appellate review to an order granting a motion to dismiss 2 and
approached the question of law regarding what duty of care the pharmacies owed the Appellants
de novo. 3 The Court also declined to discuss the district court’s analysis of dram shop liability,
declaring it inapplicable to the present case.
Because potential pharmacy liability to third parties was an issue of first impression in
Nevada, the Court relied on a Florida District Court of Appeal opinion regarding the same issue,
Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc. 4 In Dent, the plaintiff was injured when a pharmacy customer,
under the influence of prescription drugs, fell asleep at the wheel of her vehicle and struck Dent. 5
Florida’s district court dismissed Dent’s complaint because it did not sufficiently allege that the
pharmacy owed the injured motorist a duty of care. 6 On appeal, the court in Dent refused to
recognize a duty of care between the pharmacy and Dent because the parties did not have a direct
relationship to one another 7 and Dent was not a known or identifiable third party, 8 emphasizing
that it would be overly inclusive to impose a duty of care on pharmacies on behalf of the
motoring public as a rule. 9
Analogizing the present case to Dent, the Court held that pharmacies do not owe a duty
of care to unidentified third parties injured by a pharmacy customer because no special
relationship exists between the pharmacy and the third party that would justify such a duty of
care. Based on this assessment, the Court declined to discuss the question of whether the
Appellants’ injuries were foreseeable. The Court further concluded that nothing in the express
language or the legislative history or intent of Nevada’s public policy statement outlining a
tracking program for controlled substance prescriptions 10 implies that pharmacies have a duty to
enforce that statute’s provisions, and that therefore the policy statement does not impose any
duty on pharmacies in favor of third parties. Finally, the Court concluded that the Appellants’
negligence per se claims were properly dismissed because the statutes and regulatory provisions
prohibiting the unlawful distribution of controlled substances are not intended for the general
public’s protection or to protect against the nature of injuries sustained by the Appellants, but
rather are intended to protect the pharmacy’s customer.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Cherry, joined by Justice Saitta, wrote separately in dissent, arguing that
Appellants had appropriately alleged a claim for common law negligence because a special
relationship exists between pharmacies and their customers that extends to third parties and the
injury to the Appellants was reasonably foreseeable. Cherry based these conclusions on Nevada
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law that implies that pharmacists may be liable for civil damages for improperly distributing
prescription drugs with a lack of good faith, 11 combined with the Task Force letter notifying the
pharmacies of Copening’s potential drug abuse and the fact that the prescribed drugs, taken in
such quantities in such a limited time frame, presented a reasonable likelihood that Copening
might drive under the influence, risking injury to herself and others. Cherry further disagreed
with the majority’s assessment of Appellants’ negligence per se claims, noting that the
Legislature directed the Board of Pharmacy to adopt regulations to “protect[ …] the public,
appertaining to the practices of pharmacy,” 12 thereby indicating that regulations passed by the
Board of Pharmacy are directly intended to protect the general public, of which Appellants are
members. Therefore, Cherry and Siatta would have reversed the district court’s decision to
dismiss the Appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
Because no special relationship exists between the pharmacies and the Appellants,
Appellants could not properly allege a claim of common-law negligence for their injuries.
Moreover, Appellants’ claim of negligence per se fails in the absence of evidence that
regulations governing the distribution of controlled substances were intended to protect third
parties from harm resulting from a pharmacy customer’s prescription drug abuse. Therefore, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
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